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Abstract 
The viability of modern open science norms and practices depend on public disclosure of 
new knowledge, methods, and materials. However, increasing industry funding of research 
can restrict the dissemination of results and materials. We show, through a survey sample of 
837 German scientists in life sciences, natural sciences, engineering, and social sciences, that 
scientists who receive industry funding are twice as likely to deny requests for research 
inputs as those who do not. Receiving external funding in general does not affect denying 
others access. Scientists who receive external funding of any kind are, however, 50% more 
likely to be denied access to research materials by others, but this is not affected by being 
funded specifically by industry. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent decades have seen a shift in academic research towards the ‘entrepreneurial university’ 
model. Researchers are encouraged to actively participate in innovation through channels such as 
academic patenting, joint work with industry, or academic entrepreneurship (Etzkowitz, 2003). 
Besides obvious benefits of technology transfer and increased funding at research institutions 
through industry collaborations, scholars have expressed concerns that the shift towards 
entrepreneurial universities may entail negative implications for the rate and direction of 
academic research. Examples include trade-offs between publishing and patenting (Azoulay et 
al., 2009), academic entrepreneurship and the ‘brain drain’ in academia (Toole and Czarnitzki, 
2010; Aghion et al., 2008), the dissemination of research results (Czarnitzki et al., 2011; 
Blumenthal et al., 1996a,b; Cohen et al., 1998; Gans and Murray, 2011; Thursby and Thursby, 
2007), and the withholding of information, data and materials on which research is based (Walsh 
et al., 2007; Haeussler, 2011; Haeussler et al., 2014). 
This paper seeks to contribute to the latter stream of research. Sharing data and material 
inputs to research is one of the cornerstones of scientific progress since it allows replication, 
validation and the cumulative advance of knowledge in a field. Data and research materials are 
also a major source of scientific misconduct. One prominent case is the South Korean scientist 
Woo-Suk Hwang and his colleagues who published an article in Science in 2005 claiming to 
have isolated embryonic stem cells from a cloned human embryo (Hwang et al., 2005). Scientists 
immediately started research to build on these highly exciting findings. However, the published 
results turned out to be fabricated, and the paper was retracted less than a year later (Azoulay et 
al., 2012). Another case is the prolific Danish neuroscientist Milena Penkowa who had published 
3 
 
almost 100 papers in renowned journals. In January 2011 Nature reported that Penkowa had left 
her position at the University of Copenhagen under allegations of scientific misconduct 
(including the fabrication of data and misspending of grant money). While Penkowa had been 
cleared of allegations of scientific fraud in 2008 (colleagues had trouble replicating her results), 
new allegations arose in 2010: two of Penkowa’s students did not manage to replicate data 
submitted to the Journal of Clinical Oncology by Penkowa (see Callaway, 2011). More 
generally, Azoulay et al. (2012) find that out of the 1104 retractions identified in ‘Pubmed’, the 
US National Library of Medicine, 739 (67%) were due to issues related to data fabrication, data 
errors or mistakes, failure to replicate results, or plagiarism. This suggests that more open 
sharing of data and material could serve as a major source of quality control in scientific 
research.  
In this paper, we focus on how extramural and in particular industry funding of academic 
research affect academics’ sharing behavior. Although extramural and particularly industry 
funding of research are responsible for a growing share of academic research (OECD, Main 
Science and Technology Indicators, 2010), relatively little attention has been devoted to studying 
the relationship between funding and sharing behavior. Industry funding has frequently been 
characterized as posing restrictions on researchers, prohibiting or delaying the open disclosure of 
research results (Blumenthal et al. 1996a,b; Cohen et al. 1998; Gans and Murray 2011; Thursby 
and Thursby 2007). This could hamper scientific research, as the public disclosure of research 
results limits a duplication of research, and facilitates replication and follow-up research 
(Dasgupta and David 1994).  
Our research builds on a broad individual-level dataset of German academics. Germany 
experienced the largest growth in industry sponsorship of academic research (13.4 percentage 
4 
 
points between 1995 and 2007) among developed countries, making it especially suitable for this 
investigation. Moreover, our data allow us to provide evidence for a broad set of scientific 
disciplines while prior research is largely confined to the bio sciences which are characterized by 
all kinds of peculiarities in research conduct and funding compared to other disciplines (e.g., 
Haeussler, 2011; Haeussler et al., 2014). In the regressions we disentangle total extramural 
funding received from funding that comes specifically from industry sponsors and find that, 
controlling for personal characteristics, research characteristics, institutional affiliations, and 
scientific fields, scientists who receive external funding from any source are more likely to be 
denied access to others’ research results or materials. Those who receive industry funding are 
more likely to deny others’ requests for access. These results reflect the changes in incentives of 
researchers to disclose as funding moves towards the private sector. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes current 
literature on academics’ sharing behavior and the relation between industry sponsorship of 
academic research and disclosure. Section 3 describes the data and methods. Results and 
concluding remarks are shown in sections 4 and 5. 
2. Literature background 
2.1 Input sharing among academics 
A few recent studies have looked more in detail into academics’ sharing behavior. Walsh et al. 
(2007) surveyed 507 academic researchers in biomedical sciences to assess what affects access 
to knowledge and material inputs. Of the scientists surveyed in the two years before the survey 
75% requested material and made seven requests on average. Only 81% of the most recent 
requests were fulfilled. Those receiving the requests reported that they did not fulfill the request 
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in 6% of the cases. Their results indicate that requests to scientists active in business, scientists in 
fields with higher degrees of competition, and scientists with higher publication outputs were 
more likely to remain unfulfilled. However, the authors found no significant effect of the 
requesting scientist’s industry funding. 
Haussler (2011) reports the likelihood with which scientists in industry and academe 
share information, using a survey of bioscientists in Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Academic scientists reported providing 85% of the requested information, while industry 
researchers reported to have provided 58%. The share of information exchanged further depends 
negatively on its competitive value, the expected level of reciprocity (positively, but only among 
industrial researchers), social factors (norms regarding information sharing and entrepreneurs in 
the scientists’ family), the type of enquirer, and the degree to which the requested information is 
protected by non-disclosure agreements. 
Haeussler et al. (2014) hypothesize that information sharing among academics is highly 
context-specific, arguing that specific requests for information or materials are weighted in terms 
of future reciprocity versus current loss of competitiveness, while general sharing of intermediate 
results is affected by the need for feedback versus potential misappropriation. They then employ 
a survey of 1173 bioscientists in Germany and the United Kingdom to support these claims, 
showing that specific as well as general sharing are negatively affected by competition in the 
field and the importance researchers attach to patents for their reputation. Moreover, tenured 
professors are more likely to engage in specific information sharing. General sharing occurs less 
often in larger teams and by people who have applied for more patents, but more often for 
researchers who publish more.  
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2.2 External sponsorship and disclosure 
Several papers have found harmful effects of industry sponsorship on the disclosure of research 
findings. For instance, Gans and Murray (2011) report, based on data on contract terms offered 
to industrial sponsors, that the majority of contracts allowed for the restriction and disclosure of 
information designated as confidential. Blumenthal et al. (1996b) surveyed 210 life science 
companies to find evidence of publication delays and secrecy restrictions on information 
resulting from academic research. Thursby and Thursby (2007) surveyed 112 firms engaged in 
university licensing to find that 90% of the university contracts include clauses on withholding of 
research results. 
Blumenthal et al. published six studies in which they report the results of three life 
science faculty surveys between 1985 and 2000 (Blumenthal et al. 1986, 1996a, 1997, 2006; 
Campbell et al. 2000, 2002). These studies find that researchers with industry sponsored projects 
are more likely to report industry ownership of results, pre-publication review, publication 
delays, and secrecy. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) employ a survey of German researchers to 
investigate the relation between industry sponsorship and the disclosure of academic research, in 
the forms of publication delays and secrecy, finding that scientists with higher degrees of 
industry sponsorship (i.e. a larger share of their total budget comes from industry sources) have 
higher probabilities of facing publication delays, or (partial or full) publication bans. The amount 
of total extramural funding also has a positive effect on withholding research results. 
Hong and Walsh (2009) combined two surveys of researchers in experimental biology, 
mathematics, and physics on how safe they perceived discussing current work with colleagues. 
In 1966, 49% of the surveyed 1,042 scientists indicate not feeling safe talking with others about 
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their research. By 1998, this increased to 72% (out of 192 scientists surveyed). This increase is 
strongest in experimental biology where the share of scientists concerned with secrecy has 
skyrocketed from 55% to 87%. The authors then show that having industry funding relates to 
higher levels of increased secrecy, as does having stronger scientific competition. 
The above overview suggests extramural and particularly industry funding to be related 
to the likelihood that scientists will share their data and material inputs and to the likelihood that 
scientists themselves will deny others access to their inputs. In the following, we seek to provide 
empirical evidence based on a comprehensive sample of German academics in order to elucidate 
the relationship between funding and sharing behavior. 
3. Data and Methods 
We use data from an online survey of German academic researchers performed by the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) in the context of an evaluation of the EU’s 6th European 
Framework programme. The survey was conducted in 2008. The sample includes German Ph.D. 
level researchers who were employed at universities or not-for-profit research institutions. To 
identify university professors, a register (“Hochschullehrerverzeichnis”) was employed that 
excludes teaching-oriented universities in applied sciences. Not-for-profit institutes include the 
Fraunhofer Society, the Max Planck Society, the Helmholtz Association, and the Leibniz 
Association. Scientists employed there were identified using internet searches.
1
 This yielded a 
sample frame of 16,269 scientists with known email addresses. 2,797 researchers completed at 
                                                          
1
 These institutes are major actors in German science, and have many branches across disciplines. For example, the 
Fraunhofer society has 17,000 employees in 59 institutes. The other science organizations are of comparable size. It 
is common for German university professors to head research groups at these institutes. 
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least one question in the survey. Removing observations with missing values of interest for the 
purpose of this study, we end up with a final sample of 837 observations.
2
 
We test the representativeness of our sample by comparing it to the population distribution of 
public research scientists across institutional categories (universities versus PROs) and 
disciplines obtained from the Federal Statistical Office. The official and sample shares are 
presented in Table 1. While the sample is reasonably representative of the population, there are 
some small differences. Our sample has 8% more scientists employed in public research 
organizations than the population. The sample also contains 5% more life scientists, 2.4% fewer 
science/humanities researchers, and 1.8% fewer natural scientists than the population. To ensure 
the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the regression models presented in section 4 
adjusting for any bias caused by field or institute sampling through population weights based on 
eight institute-field strata (see table A.1 in appendix). The results are highly similar to those of 
the un-weighted sample.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
The dependent variables are derived from two survey questions regarding the disclosure of 
research materials to colleagues. The first one asks “Have you requested any research results 
(such as software, genetic sequences, data), and/or research materials since 2002 from other 
scientists but did not get access?”. Table 2 shows summary statistics. Respondents could check 
                                                          
2
 The large discrepancy here is caused in part by many researchers filling in only few questions. Only 1,400 
scientists considered all questions in the survey. As these still had some item non-response, we had to exclude part 
of the sample. 
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boxes “yes”, “no”, or “not specified”. 139 respondents, or 17% of the sample, indicated that they 
had requested results or materials but did not receive them. The second question asked “Have 
you denied other scientists access to your research results or materials since 2002?”. This was the 
case for 57 respondents (7%). Of those who were denied or who denied access (169 
observations), 112 (66%) were denied access but did not deny it themselves, 30 (18%) only 
denied access to others, and 27 (16%) did both. 
The main explanatory variables are two dummy variables whether the researcher received 
funding from third-party sources and whether, among the third-party resources, the researcher 
received funding specifically from industry. Both dummies correspond to the time period 2002-
2006. 84% of the researchers reported third-party funding, and 33% reported that they received 
industry funding. Scientists who received third-party funding were significantly more likely to be 
denied access to others’ research results or materials (18% of those with funding vs. 10% of 
those who did not (t-test on mean differences = -2.35, p-value = 0.02), but not more likely to 
deny access to others (7% vs. 7%, t-test = -0.05, p-value=0.96). Scientists who received industry 
funding were not more likely to be denied access by others (18% vs. 16%, t-test = -0.79, p-value 
= 0.43), but were more likely do deny others (12% vs. 4%, t-test = -3.86, p-value < 0.01). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
We control in the analysis for research characteristics, personal characteristics, scientific 
domains, and institutional affiliations. Research characteristics include the individual’s position 
at the institution, the number of publications and patent applications, and the number of scientists 
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employed at the respondent’s institute who work on similar topics. The latter serves as a proxy 
for the degree of scientific competition of the field, as greater scientific competition associates 
with higher levels of secrecy (Hong and Walsh, 2009; Haeussler, 2011). Personal characteristics 
are age, gender, and whether the scientist is tenured. In terms of domains, the researchers were 
grouped in four broad fields consisting of life sciences, natural sciences, engineering, and social 
sciences. Institutional affiliations include universities, the four large public research associations 
(Fraunhofer, Max-Planck, Helmholtz and Leibniz), and a residual group of other affiliations 
(these include public research institutes which are financed by the states and not the federal 
government, for instance).
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To examine the relation between third-party and industry funding and the disclosure of 
research results and materials, we specify Probit models. Since the descriptive statistics suggest 
being denied access and denying access to be related, we also specify a Bivariate Probit model to 
account for any error term correlation between the equations of being denied access and denying 
access to others.  
4. Results 
Table 3 presents the regression results. We first estimate a Probit model for ‘Being denied access 
by others’ (column 1). Other factors equal, scientists who received third party funding are more 
likely to have been denied access to others’ research results and materials. The magnitude of the 
marginal effect is also sizeable: other factors at the mean, the probability of being denied access 
                                                          
3 All these variables have been collected in the survey. In order to check the reliability of the information provided 
in the survey, we also gathered the publication and patent data from external databases (the ISI Web of Science and 
the PATSTAT patent database). Although the numbers did not match exactly, the results do not depend on the 
source of the data (survey vs. publication/patent databases). This test of data reliability makes us confident that also 
the other variables are quite accurately reported by the scientists. Note that the results reported below are obtained 
by using the externally collected patent and publication data. 
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increases from 14% to 21% if the dummy indicating third party funding switches from zero to 
unit value. Receiving funding specifically from industry and the other research characteristics do 
not have significant effects. In line with previous studies (e.g. Hong and Walsh 2009), we 
observe that scientists in the life sciences are more likely to be denied access.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Concerning the equation on ‘Denying access’ (column 2), we find no significant effect of third-
party funding. This indicates that extramural funding in general, including funding from German 
or European government organizations, does not hamper the direct dissemination of results and 
materials to others. However, the coefficient of receiving industry funding is positive and 
significant. The size of the marginal effect is large: other factors at the mean, receiving industry 
funding increases the probability of denying access from 5% to 10%. The switch from no 
industry contracts to having industry funding thus doubles the likelihood of keeping research 
materials secret.  
Column 3 jointly estimates both equations in a Bivariate Probit model taking the 
correlation between the error terms into account. The error term correlation is positive (ρ = 0.5) 
and significant (LR test on correlation being zero: χ²(1) = 27.18, p-value < 0.01). We thus 
conclude that a random shock resulting in being denied access to material also translates into the 
reaction of denying access to others and vice versa. The results concerning the coefficient 
estimates model are very similar to the univariate Probit models. 
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We interpret our findings as follows: the result that researchers who have industry 
funding are more likely to deny access to research materials might, in line with the literature, 
reflect clauses in the contracts with industry sponsors that the research has to be kept secret (at 
least for a certain amount of time) so that the industry sponsor can appropriate possible 
commercial returns afterwards. In addition, the scientist might realize that she or he possesses a 
monopoly in a certain domain and that this could not only be profitable for the institution 
regarding research budgets but also privately profitable, be it either supplemental remuneration 
by the public research institution for attracting outside funding or other private consulting 
contracts. Since the result in the ‘Deny access’ equation is only found for the industry dummy 
and not for the extramural funding in general, it is plausible to assume that contract clauses 
imposed by the industry partners are the main reason for not sharing materials. As this strongly 
contradicts the paradigm of open science the trend towards entrepreneurial universities should 
not be celebrated for improved technology transfer without caution as, in the extreme, it 
threatens the trust, credibility (because of impossible replication of results) and the evolution of 
science, and thus also technological progress in the long-run. 
When we consider the results for the likelihood to be denied access to research materials 
it turns out that industry funding is not of particular importance. Instead we find that scientists 
with extramural research funding in general are more likely to be denied access. We attribute this 
finding to the fact that these scientists might conduct research in domains that are more 
competitive than the topics that are being investigated by people that did not rely on extramural 
research funding. While funding processes are usually merit-based and highly credentialed 
scientists are more likely to secure such funding (Grimpe, 2012), our result do not suggest, 
however, that being denied access or denying access is connected to the scientists’ individual 
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research productivity in terms of publications and patents. In that sense, we do not find the two 
outcomes to be particularly salient for “star” versus “non-star” scientists. 
Before we conclude, note that we also re-estimate the models using linear probability 
models (LPMs) rather than Probit models. While the LPM assumes constant marginal effects 
over the distribution of the regressors and could produce predictions that are not bound between 
zero and one, it, unlike the Probit model, does not require the normality assumption which, if 
violated, could lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates in the Probit model. All the findings 
reported above were very similarly found using the LPMs and therefore we do not report these in 
more detail here. 
Also note that we tested for heterogeneity of the identified effects across scientific fields. 
Neither of these tests showed significant differences. This is noteworthy as most existing 
research focuses on the life sciences. We find that the relationship between extramural/industry 
funding and the access to research materials does not significantly differ between life sciences, 
natural sciences, engineering and social sciences. Admittedly, our field definitions are quite 
broad because of our limited sample size. More research could be devoted to the heterogeneity 
across fields in order to further investigate this issue.  
5. Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive and cross-discipline dataset on German academics, we provide evidence 
that industry sponsorship relates to increased denial of requests for research results and materials 
while extramural funding in general is related to scientists experiencing denial of access 
themselves. Hence, our research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we connect 
research on academics’ sharing behavior with the literature that studies the implications of 
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extramural and particularly industry funding on the disclosure of academic research. In that 
sense, we complement other research on the relation between industry funding and disclosure, 
which argues that industry sponsorship can harm the public disclosure of academic research 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Blumenthal et al. 1986, 1996a, b, 1997, 2006; Campbell et al. 2000, 
2002, Hong and Walsh, 2007; Walsh et al. 2007).  
Second, prior research has largely focused on university scientists the bio sciences. Our 
study broadens the results obtained in prior research by considering a more general sample of 
scientific disciplines and institutions. We show that limited sharing as a result of extramural 
funding is not only a phenomenon apparent only in the bio sciences but instead a broad problem. 
This is further illustrated in the regression tables provided in appendix table A.2, where we 
estimate the probability to deny access to others in and outside of the life sciences. The effect is 
present in both, even though the marginal effect of industry funding is much higher in the life 
sciences (industry funding more than quadruples the probability of denying funding to others 
from 2% to 9% in the life sciences, compared with a doubling from 5% to 10% outside of the life 
sciences). 
An implication of our findings is that scientific institutions may need to consider policies 
that govern the sharing behavior of scientists in order to assure the opportunity to replicate, 
validate and cumulatively advance the knowledge in the field. Our results also stress that these 
policies need to be encompassing in the sense that they do not only pertain to research in the life 
sciences. Another implication concerns the funding bodies, particularly governments and science 
foundations, which could more actively promote open science and urge scientists to share their 
research inputs with others. 
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Tables 
Table 1 German academic scientist population and sample field distribution 
 Population Share 
Academic Scientists 
Sample Share 
Academic Scientists 
Employed in university (vs. PRO) 67.6% 59.6% 
   
Field   
Natural sciences 31.1% 29.3% 
Engineering sciences 19.3% 19.6% 
Life sciences 25.2% 29.2% 
Social sciences and humanities 24.4% 22.0% 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable 
full sample 
Was not denied 
access 
Was denied access 
Did not deny 
access 
Denied access 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Total observations (%) 837 (100%) 698 (83%) 139 (17%) 780 (93%) 57 (7%) 
Research characteristics           
Was denied access  0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.144 0.351 0.474 0.504 
Denied access to others 0.068 0.252 0.043 0.203 0.194 0.397 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Received third party funding 0.840 0.367 0.827 0.379 0.906 0.292 0.840 0.367 0.842 0.368 
Received industry funding 0.331 0.471 0.325 0.469 0.360 0.482 0.314 0.464 0.561 0.501 
Research group leader 0.730 0.444 0.722 0.448 0.770 0.422 0.726 0.446 0.789 0.411 
Journal publications 35.014 58.483 34.665 58.573 36.770 58.208 35.882 59.741 23.140 35.484 
Patent applications 0.802 2.818 0.811 2.869 0.755 2.559 0.754 2.713 1.456 3.969 
Number of peers in institute 24.201 48.809 23.244 45.853 29.007 61.519 24.017 49.451 26.719 39.241 
Personal characteristics           
Researcher has tenure 0.836 0.370 0.850 0.358 0.770 0.422 0.840 0.367 0.789 0.411 
Female dummy 0.146 0.353 0.146 0.353 0.144 0.352 0.145 0.352 0.158 0.368 
Age  49.542 8.377 50.200 8.373 46.239 7.608 49.635 8.394 48.264 8.106 
Science domains           
Life sciences 0.292 0.455 0.259 0.439 0.453 0.500 0.295 0.456 0.246 0.434 
Natural sciences 0.293 0.455 0.315 0.465 0.180 0.385 0.303 0.460 0.158 0.368 
Engineering 0.196 0.397 0.193 0.395 0.209 0.408 0.176 0.381 0.474 0.504 
Social sciences 0.220 0.414 0.232 0.422 0.158 0.366 0.227 0.419 0.123 0.331 
Institutions           
Employed at university 0.596 0.491 0.605 0.489 0.554 0.499 0.606 0.489 0.456 0.503 
Employed at Fraunhofer Society 0.049 0.216 0.050 0.218 0.043 0.204 0.042 0.201 0.140 0.350 
Employed at Max Planck Society 0.091 0.287 0.092 0.289 0.086 0.282 0.092 0.290 0.070 0.258 
Employed at Helmholtz Association 0.154 0.361 0.148 0.355 0.187 0.391 0.147 0.355 0.246 0.434 
Employed at Leibniz Association 0.063 0.244 0.054 0.227 0.108 0.311 0.064 0.245 0.053 0.225 
Employed at other research institute 0.091 0.287 0.092 0.289 0.086 0.282 0.090 0.286 0.105 0.310 
20 
 
Table 3: Multivariate regression results 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Was denied 
access 
Denied 
access to 
others 
Was 
denied 
access 
Denied 
access to 
others 
Received third party funding 0.389** -0.335 0.375** -0.297 
 
(0.182) (0.225) (0.181) (0.221) 
Received industry funding 0.056 0.481*** 0.043 0.417** 
 
(0.131) (0.177) (0.131) (0.175) 
Female dummy -0.137 0.195 -0.123 0.222 
 
(0.162) (0.204) (0.159) (0.198) 
Age  -0.086 0.102 -0.079 0.115 
 
(0.074) (0.096) (0.075) (0.097) 
Age squared 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Researcher has tenure -0.041 -0.391* -0.044 -0.342 
 
(0.177) (0.228) (0.176) (0.227) 
Research group leader 0.185 0.355* 0.174 0.344* 
 
(0.141) (0.193) (0.141) (0.191) 
Journal publications 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Patent applications -0.004 0.012 -0.006 0.010 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Number of peers in institute 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Domain: life sciences 0.470*** 0.161 0.482*** 0.194 
 
(0.167) (0.241) (0.167) (0.241) 
Domain: natural sciences -0.262 -0.114 -0.235 -0.103 
 
(0.184) (0.260) (0.184) (0.259) 
Domain: engineering 0.223 0.661*** 0.217 0.671*** 
 
(0.191) (0.238) (0.191) (0.239) 
Employed at Fraunhofer Society -0.194 0.478* -0.147 0.501* 
 
(0.292) (0.278) (0.287) (0.275) 
Employed at Max Planck Society 0.018 0.329 -0.009 0.317 
 
(0.213) (0.297) (0.215) (0.294) 
Employed at Helmholtz Association 0.323* 0.601*** 0.314* 0.614*** 
 
(0.174) (0.218) (0.172) (0.216) 
Employed at Leibniz Association 0.680*** 0.397 0.662*** 0.333 
 
(0.213) (0.320) (0.214) (0.324) 
Employed at other research institute 0.012 0.209 -0.020 0.130 
 
(0.198) (0.255) (0.202) (0.264) 
Intercept 1.370 -4.183* 1.218 -4.559* 
 
(1.770) (2.333) (1.784) (2.349) 
Corr (     ) 
  
0.501*** 
# Observations 837 837 837 
Log-Likelihood -338.11 -181.63 -506.16 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *(,**,***): p < 0.1(p  < 0.05, p < 0.01).  
Columns (1), (2): Probit models; (3): Bivariate Probit models.  
Reference categories for the dummy variables: male, non group leader, untenured, social 
scientist, employed at a university. 
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Appendix  
Table A.1 weighted regression results using eight institution-discipline strata 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Was denied 
access 
Denied access to 
others 
Was denied 
access 
Was denied 
access 
Received third party funding 0.378** -0.352* 0.365** -0.309 
 
(0.184) (0.211) (0.184) (0.214) 
Received industry funding 0.049 0.458** 0.036 0.397** 
 
(0.133) (0.180) (0.132) (0.180) 
Female dummy -0.135 0.227 -0.117 0.246 
 
(0.167) (0.212) (0.164) (0.210) 
Age  -0.077 0.119 -0.070 0.133 
 
(0.075) (0.091) (0.076) (0.089) 
Age squared 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Researcher has tenure -0.013 -0.485** -0.017 -0.440* 
 
(0.176) (0.230) (0.175) (0.228) 
Research group leader 0.146 0.381** 0.134 0.371** 
 
(0.139) (0.170) (0.140) (0.173) 
Journal publications 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Patent applications -0.002 0.016 -0.005 0.015 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) 
Number of peers in institute -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Domain: life sciences 0.471*** 0.042 0.483*** 0.082 
 
(0.167) (0.248) (0.167) (0.244) 
Domain: natural sciences -0.286 -0.110 -0.258 -0.095 
 
(0.187) (0.260) (0.185) (0.257) 
Domain: engineering 0.208 0.654*** 0.203 0.664*** 
 
(0.195) (0.253) (0.194) (0.250) 
Employed at Fraunhofer Society -0.239 0.482 -0.190 0.504* 
 
(0.273) (0.297) (0.268) (0.292) 
Employed at Max Planck Society -0.026 0.160 -0.058 0.129 
 
(0.230) (0.303) (0.234) (0.293) 
Employed at Helmholtz Association 0.406** 0.601*** 0.396** 0.625*** 
 
(0.180) (0.222) (0.178) (0.223) 
Employed at Leibniz Association 0.642*** 0.278 0.623*** 0.219 
 
(0.222) (0.333) (0.223) (0.317) 
Employed at other research institute 0.077 0.237 0.048 0.160 
 
(0.207) (0.247) (0.214) (0.244) 
Intercept 1.212 -4.600** 1.047 -4.994** 
 
(1.813) (2.276) (1.836) (2.228) 
Corr (     ) 
  
0.585*** 
# Observations 837 837 837 
Log-Likelihood -328.261 -169.045 -135922.9 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *(,**,***): p < 0.1(p  < 0.05, p < 0.01).  
Columns (1), (2): Probit models; (3): Bivariate Probit models.  
Reference categories for the dummy variables: male, non group leader, untenured, social scientist, employed at a 
university. 
 
22 
 
Table A.2: Denying access to others: life sciences versus other fields 
 
(1) (2) 
 
In life sciences Outside life sciences 
Received third party funding -0.844 -0.367 
 
(0.514) (0.279) 
Received industry funding 0.988** 0.504** 
 
(0.453) (0.210) 
Female dummy 0.669* 0.034 
 
(0.385) (0.273) 
Age  0.019 0.157 
 
(0.272) (0.111) 
Age squared -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Researcher has tenure -0.048 -0.483* 
 
(0.476) (0.280) 
Research group leader 0.682 0.320 
 
(0.502) (0.224) 
Journal publications -0.005 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
Patent applications -0.178 0.017 
 
(0.204) (0.023) 
Number of peers in institute 0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Domain: natural sciences  -0.137 
  (0.274) 
Domain: engineering  0.569** 
  (0.246) 
Employed at Fraunhofer Society 0.398 0.508 
 
(0.829) (0.309) 
Employed at Max Planck Society 1.087** -0.133 
 
(0.520) (0.484) 
Employed at Helmholtz Association 0.700 0.662** 
 
(0.464) (0.265) 
Employed at Leibniz Association 1.431** -0.021 
 
(0.581) (0.479) 
Employed at other research institute 0.140 0.316 
 
(0.598) (0.299) 
Intercept -1.610 -5.504** 
 
(6.231) (2.723) 
# Observations 244 593 
Log-Likelihood -42.075 -131.009 
Notes: Dependent variable: denied access to others. Standard errors in parentheses. *(,**,***): p < 0.1 (p < 0.05,  
p < 0.01). Probit models. Reference categories for the dummy variables: male, non group leader, untenured, 
employed at a university. Column 2: reference field: social scientist.. 
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